Abstract-Spectrum auctions provide a platform for licensed spectrum users to share their underutilized spectrum with unlicensed users. Existing spectrum auctions either adopt the protocol interference model to characterize interference relationship as binary relationship or only lease channels that are not used by the primary user (PU) to secondary users (SUs). In this paper, we design spectrum auctions under the physical interference model, which allow PU and SUs to transmit simultaneously. Specifically, we consider both single-minded and multi-minded cases, and design auctions SPA-S and SPA-M, respectively. We prove that both auctions are truthful, individually rational, and computationally efficient. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that, these designed auctions achieve higher spectrum utilization, buyer satisfaction ratio, and revenue than a representative existing spectrum auction adapted for the physical interference model. Index Terms-Cognitive radio ad hoc networks, dynamic spectrum access, spectrum auction, physical interference model, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
PECTRUM is a critical yet scarce resource due to the substantial growth of wireless technology and applications. Unused spectrum has become the darling of innovation, and its allocation has yielded many economic benefits and technological gains. Indeed, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its counterparts across the world have released licenses of unused spectrum and collected billions of dollars in the past decade.
Fundamentally different from conventional goods, spectrum is reusable, which is referred to as spatial reusability. Users can share the same channel as long as they can transmit signals simultaneously without disrupting each other's transmission. Allowing spectrum to be shared by multiple users can significantly improve the spectrum utilization efficiency. In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), there are two types of users: 1) primary users (PUs) who are spectrum license holders; 2) secondary users (SUs) who do not own any licensed channel but are willing to pay for the usage in the short term. Therefore, the PUs may be motivated to open up their underutilized spectrum for sharing with SUs, so that they may make profit by leasing access to spectrum resources.
When the spatial reusability of the spectrum is considered, one arising challenge is to characterize the interference among users in CRNs. In the literature, two main interference models have been proposed [7] : the protocol interference model and the physical interference model. Next we shall explain these two models in detail.
1) Protocol Interference Model [7] : When two users transmit using the same channel simultaneously, one user interferes with the other if the other user's receiver is within the interference range of its transmitter. A transmitter's interference range depends on its transmission power. Usually, a conflict graph is used to model the interference relationship under the protocol interference model. In this graph, each node represents a user, and an edge exists between two nodes, if one user interferes with the other, thus they cannot share the same channel. For example, Figure 1 shows a wireless network under the protocol interference model (Figure 1(a) ) and the corresponding conflict graph (Figure 1(b) ). We show the interference ranges of five links in Figure 1 (a). According to Figure 1 (b), Links 2, 4 and 5 can share a channel simultaneously. But in practice, the accumulated interference from Links 4 and 5 may fail Link 2's transmission. Unfortunately, a conflict graph only reflects the interference relationship between any two links, but does not precisely express the interference relationship between one link and a set of other links. This simplified model abstracts away the accumulative nature of interference. Even if a transmitter far away from a receiver may not corrupt the transmission, the accumulated interference from several such nodes could still generate enough interference to prevent the receiver from successfully decoding the received message.
2) Physical Interference Model [7] : The physical interference model considers the accumulative nature of interference. In this model, the success of signal transmission is determined by the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) at the receiver. Therefore, this model is also known as SINR model. Let T be a set of transmitters that simultaneously transmit over a certain channel. Then the SINR of Link (T i , R i ) can be computed by
where P i is the transmission power of
is the maximum of 1 and the Euclidean distance from transmitter T j to receiver R i , α is the path loss exponent with value between 2 and 6 usually, and N 0 is the ambient noise power level. If SINR i is no less than the threshold β i , the signal transmission is considered successful for the corresponding receiver, and it is considered unsuccessful otherwise. Figure 2 shows the same wireless network as in Figure 1 , under the SINR model. For example, Link (T 1 , R 1 ) receives interference from all other links. Then the transmission from T 1 is successfully received by R 1 if
where β 1 is the threshold. Compared with the protocol interference model, the physical model has been recognized as a more realistic model in wireless communications. Most of the existing spectrum auctions adopt the protocol interference model and thus simplify channel allocation by grouping users according to the derived conflict graphs. The foundation of these auctions is the assumption that the interference between any two users can be modeled as binary relationship. But in practice for wireless networks, a conflict graph may cause issues. On one hand, since the interference from other users is accumulative, the resulting channel allocation may not guarantee successful transmission for every user. On the other hand, a conflict graph constructed to consider the accumulated interference may eliminate potential sharing between users and thus lead to low channel utilization. For example, in Figure 1 (a) Links 3 and 5 may share the same channel. In this paper, we design spectrum auctions under the physical interference model, which characterizes interference relationship more closely to reality. In our designed spectrum auctions, we iteratively assign users to channels in a greedy manner. In each iteration, we select a user who is willing to pay a high payment for each channel and is highly resistant to interference. For each winning user, we calculate its critical value [12] (defined in Section IV-C) as its payment.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design spectrum auctions, which allow the PU and SUs to share channels simultaneously under the physical interference model. In our model, the PU and SUs can be general star networks instead of single links.
• For SUs, we consider both single-minded and multi-minded cases. In the single-minded case, an SU only accepts the number of channels as it requests; in the multi-minded case, an SU accepts any number of channels no more than it requests. We design corresponding spectrum auctions, SPA-S and SPA-M, for these two cases, respectively.
• We rigorously prove both SPA-S and SPA-M are truthful, individually rational, and computationally efficient. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give a brief review of existing spectrum auctions in the literature. In Section III, we formally describe the CRN model as well as the auction formulation. We present our designed auction SPA-S in the single-minded case, and analyze its properties in Section IV. Then we design SPA-M, which supports the multi-minded case in Section V. We evaluate the performance of SPA-S and SPA-M by comparing them with existing auctions in Section VI and conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
As pioneers in spectrum auction design, Zhou et al. [25] proposed VERITAS under the protocol model, the first truthful auction considering the spectrum reusability and computation efficiency. In [9] , based on the concept of virtual valuation, Jia et al. designed an exponential time VCGbased auction to maximize the expected revenue. Along this line, Al-Ayyoub and Gupta [1] designed a polynomial time spectrum auction that yields approximated expected revenue. Wu and Vaidya [18] designed SMALL to guarantee that the owner's utility is non-negative in the scenario where the owner of the spectrum has a reserved price for each of the channels. Following the same design methodology, Wei et al. [15] designed SHIELD that improves spectrum utilization and buyer satisfaction compared with VERITAS and SMALL. Inspired by the group-buying service on the Internet, Lin et al. [11] designed a three-state auction, called TASG that allows a leader in each group to conduct an outer auction for aggregating the bids within the group. Along this line, Yang et al. [21] designed TRUBA that significantly increases the revenue. Gopinathan and Li [6] studied spectrum auctions with prior-free setting and designed a truthful auction to approximately maximize the revenue.
TRUST [26] is the first truthful double auction designed for spectrum trading. Feng et al. [5] extended to heterogeneous spectrum auctions and designed TAHES. In [13] , a double truthful auction, called DOTA, was proposed to allow each user to bid for more than one channel. Considering the fact that secondary users may join the network in an online fashion, Wang et al. [14] designed TODA. Yang et al. [22] proposed PROMISE for maximizing the profit without the knowledge of the users valuation distribution.
In the scenario of the physical interference model, Kakhbod et al. [10] developed a truthful auction for dividing a spectrum channel into several small channels with less bandwidth, where all transmitters power levels are fixed homogeneously. In [2] , a truthful single auction was studied by Bae et al. where a sequential auction (an auction with multiple rounds) was used to reach a pure strategy equilibrium. Huang et al. [8] also introduced a truthful auction-based spectrum sharing mechanism where a group of users compete for a spectrum channel under different definitions of their utilities. Zhang et al. proposed TSA [23] , a framework for truthful double auctions under the physical interference model with power control. To the best of our knowledge, there is no truthful auction that allows the primary user and secondary users to share channels simultaneously under the physical interference model.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND AUCTION FORMULATION
In this section, we describe our network model and formulate the process of channel leasing as a spectrum auction.
A. Cognitive Radio Network Model
We consider a cognitive radio network consisting of one primary user (PU), e.g., TV broadcaster, and a set S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n } of n secondary users (SUs), e.g., wireless local area networks or cellular networks. The PU owns m homogeneous channels C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m }, and is willing to lease them for profit. The channels are assumed to be orthogonal, which means that there is no interference among users using different channels. Let P 0 denote the transmission power of the PU's transmitter, e.g., TV tower, denoted by T 0 . SUs do not have licensed spectrum channels, but are willing to pay for channels from the PU in the short term.
Most of the existing spectrum auctions model an SU as a transmitter-receiver pair. However, an SU consisting of one transmitter and multiple (rather than one) receivers is also common in reality, e.g., a cell phone tower and cell phones in the corresponding cell. The receivers associated with the same transmitter can receive signals simultaneously from their corresponding transmitter without interrupting each other. In our model, each S i ∈ S consists of one transmitter T i , e.g., access point and a set
i } of r i receivers, e.g., wireless clients. All the receivers can decode signals from T i successfully and simultaneously. Let P i denote the transmission power of T i . We can achieve spatial reuse by leasing the channel to multiple SUs, if they can transmit simultaneously. After channel allocation, let G k be the group of SUs assigned to channel c k .
We allow the PU and SUs to transmit signals over the same channels simultaneously. Let C 0 ⊆ C represent the channels that the PU is currently using. To protect the transmission of the PU from being interrupted by the transmissions of SUs, the FCC proposed a metric, named Interference Temperature Limit (ITL) [4] , which sets the maximum cumulative amount of interference that can be tolerated at the certain locations. 
where
is an indicator function defined as
is the maximum of 1 and the Euclidean distance from transmitter T i to location l j , and α is the path loss exponent with value between 2 and 6 usually.
To closely characterize the interference relationship among the SUs in G k , we adopt the physical interference model (a.k.a. SINR model). In this model, a receiver R r i can decode signals successfully from its corresponding transmitter T i if and only if its Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) [7] is no less than a threshold β i . In this system, the interference on a receiver of S i might come from both the PU and other SUs sharing the same channel c k with S i . Therefore,
where (4) , and N 0 is the ambient noise power level. Then the transmission from T i is successfully received by all S i 's receivers if
We assume that Condition (6) is satisfied for any S i when it solely occupies a channel. Otherwise we can discard it before our proposed auctions.
Before we formally describe our auctions, we introduce the following definitions: SU Tolerance [20] and Feasible Group. Definition 1 (SU Tolerance): The tolerance τ i indicates how much interference S i can endure before its SINR value falls below the threshold β i . It can be calculated by
Definition 2 (Feasible Group): A group G k of SUs is feasible with respect to S i if, after the addition of S i to the group, Condition (6) is satisfied for ∀S j ∈ G k ∪{S i } and Condition (3) is satisfied for the PU. 
B. Auction Formulation
We formulate the process of leasing channels in cognitive radio networks as a spectrum auction. In this auction, the PU is the seller and SUs are buyers. Throughout the rest of this paper, we use PU and seller, and SU and buyer interchangeably. The seller contributes a set of channels C and is using channels in C 0 ⊆ C . Each buyer S i requests d i channels and holds a private per-channel valuation v i ≥ 0 for leasing a channel. We consider two cases for buyers: 1) single-minded case, where a buyer accepts either d i channels or 0 channel; 2) multi-minded case, where a buyer accepts any x i channels if 0 ≤ x i ≤ d i . In this paper, we design spectrum auctions for both cases.
Both spectrum auctions work as follows: Each buyer submits a per-channel bid b i ≥ 0 as the maximum amount that it would pay for a channel and its number of requested channels at the beginning. After collecting the bids and requests from all buyers, we decide the channel allocation and winning buyers. We also compute the payment p i for each buyer S i .
The utility of S i is defined as follows:
where x i = d i for the single-minded case, and 0 ≤ x i ≤ d i for the multi-minded case. Table I lists the important notations.
Note that the homogeneous model can be generalized to the heterogeneous model with minor modification. In the heterogeneous case, a secondary user can have different valuations and submit bids separately for different channels. In this case we run our designed spectrum auction for each channel.
C. Desired Properties
There are three desired properties for an auction to satisfy:
• Truthfulness: an auction is truthful if each buyer obtains the highest utility by biding its true valuation of the resource.
• Individual Rationality: an auction is individually rational if all buyers have non-negative utilities by revealing their true valuations.
• Computational Efficiency: an auction is computationally efficient if it can be conducted within polynomial time. The goal of this paper is to design spectrum auctions that maximize the total number of winners, while guaranteeing the three desired properties. However, it has been proved that the problem of maximizing the number of SUs sharing one channel with the PU is NP-hard in [3] . Since our problem without considering the economic properties is a generalized 1 , G 2 , . . . , G m }; 14 return G version of the problem in [3] , we claim that our problem is NP-hard as well. Guaranteeing the economic properties makes it more challenging to design approximation algorithms. Therefore, we focus on fast heuristic algorithms that can be deployed in practice and yet assure the spectrum auctions the economic properties. Further theoretical analysis of the approximation ratio and designing approximation algorithms will be our future work directions.
IV. AUCTION DESIGN FOR SINGLE-MINDED CASE
In this section, we introduce the basic design of a SPectrum Auction under the physical interference model, named SPA-S, where buyers are single-minded, i.e., a buyer S i that requests d i channels only accepts either all d i channels or none.
A. High-Level Description
SPA-S consists of two stages: channel allocation and pricing. The channel allocation stage sorts buyers based on both their bids and tolerances. Then for each buyer we check the feasibility of each of m channels sequentially and assign this buyer to the first d i feasible channels. If there exist d i feasible channels, this buyer is considered as a winner, otherwise a loser. In the pricing stage, we determine the payment for each winner, which is its critical value. We present the detailed algorithms in the following two subsections.
B. Channel Allocation
Intuitively, when we choose a buyer to allocate a channel, the one with a large per-channel bid and high tolerance is preferred. In other words, this buyer is willing to pay more for each channel and more resistant to interference. This property is best characterized by the product:b i = b i τ i . Note that we choose the product of b i and τ i , because both factors are equally essential but maybe in different orders of magnitude.
In the stage of channel allocation as shown in Algorithm 1, we sort all SUs and allocate SUs sequentially from S 1 to S n . For each buyer S i , the algorithm checks whether G k is feasible Algorithm 2: SPA-S-Pricing (S, G) 
The algorithm assigns S i to the first d i feasible channels if available. We use another binary variable a ik to denote the allocation status for S i . If c k is allocated to S i , then a ik = 1; otherwise 0. If there are less than d i feasible channels to S i , the algorithm assigns S i nothing.
C. Pricing
With each buyer either assigned d i channels or nothing, next we need to compute their payments. To maintain truthfulness, we find each winning buyer its critical value [12] .
Definition 3 (Critical Value):
The critical value is the value such that a buyer will win when bidding higher than this value and lose when bidding lower than it.
We calculate each winning buyer's critical value based on the following concept.
Definition 4 (Critical SU):
A critical SU of a winning buyer S i is an SU whose selection ahead of S i decreases the number of feasible channels to S i that is already no more than the number of channels allocated to S i in the channel allocation stage.
According to the definitions of critical value and critical SU, the critical value of each winning buyer is calculated based on its first critical SU. Thus it suffices to find the first critical SU of each winning buyer. Algorithm 2 illustrates the payment computation for all buyers. The basic idea is that for each winner S i ∈ W , we first take S i out of the sorted list S and is S i 's critical value. If we cannot find the critical value for S i , the payment is 0.
D. Analysis
We prove that SPA-S satisfies the desired properties defined in Section III. The proof can be found in [24] .
Theorem 1: SPA-S is truthful, individually rational, and computationally efficient.
V. AUCTION DESIGN FOR MULTI-MINDED CASE
In this section, we design a spectrum auction, called SPA-M, for the multi-minded case, where S i requests d i channels but accepts any number of channels between 0 and d i .
A. Channel Allocation
The channel allocation stage is presented in Algorithm 3. Compared to the channel allocation stage in the single-minded case, when the number of feasible channels for S i is no more than d i , we allocate if there is any available. We use x i to denote the number of channels allocated to S i in Line 9.
B. Pricing
In this section, we describe the pricing stage for the multi-minded case, illustrated in Algorithm 4. The payment calculation for each winner is based on the critical SUs.
The fundamental difference from the pricing stage for the single-minded case is that now a buyer accepts any x i channels between 0 and d i . Different bids may result in different numbers of allocated channels. Thus the payment cannot be calculated solely based on a single value as in the singleminded case, where a winner will become a loser if it bids below its critical value. In the multi-minded case, bidding below the critical value of a channel, a winner will lose this Algorithm 4: SPA-M-Pricing (S, G) makes this channel infeasible to S i , and the number of feasible channels of S i is no more than
is a critical SU of S i , and the correspondingb q τ i is the payment of S i for one of its allocated channels. The total payment is the sum of payments for all its allocated channels.
C. Analysis
We prove that SPA-M satisfies the desired properties.
SPA-M
Theorem 2: is truthful, individually rational, and computationally efficient.
Proof: It is not intuitive to prove this lemma using the critical value as we did in Lemma 1, because the payment calculated in the pricing stage is the summation of multiple values. Thus we prove truthfulness using its definition.
Recall that x i is the number of channels allocated to S i in the channel allocation stage. In the pricing stage, when the number of remaining feasible channels to S i is no more than x i , we find a critical SU of S i every time one channel becomes infeasible to it. Let Q i denote the set of S i 's critical SUs found in all iterations. Thus we have |Q i| = x i . Since multiple channels may correspond to the same critical SU, Q i might be a multiset.
Assume for each buyer S i , it wins x i channels and pays p i by bidding b i , and it wins x i channels and pays p i by bidding b i < b i . We first prove that the following statement holds: 
For each critical SU in Q i , it makes one channel infeasible to S i . Thus it also makes one channel infeasible to S i , when S i is considered according to S . Thus we have Q i ⊆ Q i .
. Because the ranking of each critical SU in Q i \Q i is ahead of S i in S and after S i in S , we have (10) .
In the following, we prove that SPA-M is truthful, i.e., 
We consider the following two cases separately:
We rearrange (11) and have
Similar as Case 1, we have and |Q i | = x i . Because S i 's critical SUs are ranked after it in the sorted list S, we haveb
We now analyze the running time of SPA-M. To allocate x i channels to a buyer S i , Algorithm 3 needs to examine at most m channels. This process takes O((m + n)n) time for n buyers. Algorithm 4's complexity only comes from the processes of initialization and checking feasibility for S q , which is O((m + n)n) for each buyer. In total, the overall time complexity of SPA-M is O ((m + n)n 2 ) . 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Setup
First, we investigate the advantages of physical interference model by comparing SPA-S and SPA-M with VERITAS and Range-VERITAS [25] for single-minded and multiminded cases, respectively. Theses two auctions form groups during channel allocation as SPA-S and SPA-M but were designed under the protocol interference model. Then we examine the channel allocation mechanisms in SPA-S and SPA-M by comparing them with an existing spectrum auction. Most of the known prior works [11] , [15] , [18] , [21] form groups before channel allocation to achieve spatial reusability, according to the given conflict graphs under the protocol interference model. As we surveyed in Section II, there is no existing auction under the physical interference model. However, they can be modified to adopt the physical interference model by forming groups under SINR constraints, as Zhang et al. [23] did in TSA. Note that the existing spectrum auctions do not allow SUs to share channels with the PU. In our evaluation, we choose SMALL [18] , which is most related to our auctions. Since the stage of group formation in SMALL must be bid-independent, we implemented an effective heuristic algorithm for link scheduling in [19] to group SUs. We name the modified SMALL as P-SMALL-S and P-SMALL-M, for single-minded and multi-minded cases, respectively.
Based on the parameters pertaining to cellular networks, we randomly distributed the PU and SUs in a 100,000 by 100,000 meters square area, which is roughly the size of the Los Angeles metropolitan area [17] . The length of links depends on the radius of the cells in cellular networks, which may vary from 1,000 to 30,000 meters [16] . Thus, all the links, including both the PU links and SU links, were uniformly randomly generated in length between 1,000 and l max , where l max varied from 5,000 to 10,000. The transmitter of PU was placed in the center of the square region. We set the transmission power P i = 20 watts for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, since the typical transmission power of a cellular base station is from a few watts to 100 watts, which is the maximum power required by FCC. In addition, we have the path loss exponent α = 4, background noise N 0 = 10 −16 , and the SINR threshold β = 16. We assume that the values of all SUs are distributed uniformly at random over (0, 100], and each buyer requests at most 3 channels. All the results were averaged over 1000 runs for each configuration of the parameters.
We use the following three performance metrics.
• Channel Utilization: Average number of buyers allocated to each channel.
• Buyer Satisfaction Ratio: The percentage of buyers who win at least one channel.
• Revenue: The total payment from all the winning buyers. In our evaluation, we show the impact of the number of SUs (n), the number of total channels (m) and the number of channels used by the PU (d 0 ) on different spectrum auctions in terms of the above three metrics. For the impact of n, we vary it from 50 to 1000 with an increment of 100, while fixing m = 10 and d 0 = 5. For the impact of m, we vary it from 5 to 25 with an increment of 5, while fixing n = 500 and d 0 = 5. For the impact of d 0 , we vary it from 5 to 10 with an increment of 1, while fixing m = 10 and n = 500.
In the multi-minded case, a buyer accepts any number of channels no greater than it requests. Specifically we are interested in the distribution of the winners' allocated-torequested ratio: the number of allocated channel over the number of requested channels of each buyer. In our evaluation, we show the distribution of the winners' allocated-to-requested ratio by fixing m = 10, n = 500 and d 0 = 5. Figure 3 shows the impact of m on the channel utilization, buyer satisfaction ratio and revenue of SPA-S, P-SMALL-S and VERITAS. Figure 3(a) shows the impact of m on the channel utilization. We observe that SPA-S outperforms P-SMALL-S and VERITAS. The reason is that P-SMALL-S and VERITAS do not allow the PU to share channels with SUs, P-SMALL-S always sacrifices one SU in each group, and VERITAS is designed under the physical interference model that characterizes the interference relationship among users as binary, which leads to low channel capacity. When there are more channels, SPA-S and P-SMALL-S gradually result in less channel utilization because the competition among SUs is no longer intense. In addition, we notice that the channel utilization of P-SMALL-S and VERITAS increase when m changes from 5 to 10. Because the PU uses 5 channels, which cannot be shared with SUs in P-SMALL-S, and the channel utilization is 0 when m = 5. That is also the reason that VERITAS's channels utilization grows with more channels. In Figure 3(b) , the satisfaction ratio of SPA-S and P-SMALL-S increase with m and stay at a steady level nearly 100% when there are enough channels for almost all SUs. We also observe that SPA-S performs better than P-SMALL-S and VERITAS, especially with fewer channels, because P-SMALL-S and VERITAS do not allow the PU to share channels with SUs. In addition, P-SMALL-S can never achieve 100% satisfaction ratio, because it always sacrifices one SU in each group to guarantee truthfulness; VERITAS has the lowest satisfaction ratio due to the low channel capacity. From Figure 3 (c) we observe that the revenue of P-SMALL-S grows when there are more channels, but converges after the saturation of the market. On the other hand, the revenue of SPA-S increases at the beginning and then falls down when m is above 20. The essential reason is that, with more channels, the competition among SUs is no longer intense, which leads to zero payments for some winners in SPA-S; but a winner's payment in P-SMALL-S is determined by the minimum bid in the group and is always greater than 0. However, the revenue of VERITAS is higher than SPA-S with more than 20 channels, because the low channel utilization results in intense competition, and the critical value of a winner becomes higher. Figure 4 shows the impact of n on the channel utilization, buyer satisfaction ratio and revenue of SPA-S, P-SMALL-S and VERITAS. Figure 4(a) illustrates the channel utilization when more SUs join the auctions. The average number of SUs in each channel in SPA-S increases gradually at first and then remains at a level around 80 due to the saturation of the market. P-SMALL-S has lower channel utilization due to the sacrifice rule. In addition, VERITAS has the lowest channel utilization, because it is designed under the physical interference model. From Figure 4 (b), we observe that, initially the satisfaction ratio is nearly 100% in SPA-S, because most SUs are winners. However, P-SMALL-S cannot achieve 100% satisfaction ratio due to its sacrifice rule. VERITAS's satisfaction ratio is the lowest because the physical interference model results in low channel capacity. The common trend is when there are more SUs, higher percentage of them cannot be winners. Thus the satisfaction ratio drops for all auctions. In Figure 4 (c), the competition between SUs becomes more intense with more SUs involved. Consequently, winners' critical values are higher, and the revenue increases in SPA-S and VERITAS. Similarly, the competition between groups in P-SMALL-S grows with more SUs, thus the seller receives more revenue. However, the payment rule in P-SMALL-S inhibits noticeable revenue growth. Figure 5 compares these auctions in terms of the three metrics, when d 0 varies. We observe that with more channels used by the PU, the performance of SPA-S decreases slightly. This is because the PU is guaranteed to be able to transmit signals successfully, and fewer SUs can be allocated to the channels that are used by the PU as a result. Whereas, P-SMALL-S decreases significantly in all three metrics, because the PU cannot share channels with SUs in P-SMALL-S. Moreover, VERITAS's channel utilization and buyer satisfaction ratio are not very high due to the low channel capacity, and its revenue falls down when PU uses more channels.
B. Evaluation Results and Analysis
For the impact of n, m and d 0 on SPA-M, P-SMALL-M and Range-VERITAS in terms of all three metrics, we have similar observations as in Figures 3, 4 and 5, which can be explained in the same way. Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of winners' allocated-to-requested ratio in SPA-M, P-SMALL-M and Range-VERITAS. We observe that most winners received more than 80% of the requested channels in all auctions. In SPA-M, more winners have the allocated-to-requested ratio higher than 80%, because SPA-M offers higher channel utilization compared with P-SMALL-M and Range-VERITAS.
We are also curious about the performance of spectrum auctions with different SUs cases, thus we compare SPA-S and SPA-M in terms of the above three metrics. Note that we have similar observations, when n, m or d 0 varies. Thus we only show the impact of d 0 in Figure 7 for illustration. We notice that SPA-M achieves higher channel utilization and buyer satisfaction ratio than SPA-S, while SPA-S has higher revenue. Because in SPA-M, the channel allocation is more flexibleSUs accept a portion of their requested channels, which leads to higher buyer satisfaction ratio and channel utilization. On the other hand, the payments in SPA-M are calculated based on multiple critical SUs, while the payments in SPA-S are calculated based on the first critical SU. With the same input, the first critical SU has the highest ranking position among all critical SUs for any winning SU, and this results in higher per-channel payment in SPA-S than SPA-M. Therefore, the revenue in SPA-S is higher than that in SPA-M.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the design of spectrum auctions which allow the primary and secondary users to share channels simultaneously under the physical interference model. For secondary users, we considered both single-minded and multi-minded cases. The difference between these two cases is whether a secondary user accepts a portion of its requested channels. We proposed SPA-S and SPA-M for these two cases, respectively. We analyzed both SPA-S and SPA-M and proved these auctions satisfy truthfulness, individual rationality, and computational efficiency. Further performance evaluation indicates SPA-S and SPA-M achieve better channel utilization and buyer satisfaction ratio compared with VERITAS [25] and SMALL [18] adapted for the physical interference model.
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